First, for Kant, transcendent noumena are no world but “problematic X” of which nothing can be said at all, even whether they do exist or not. We should eliminate this absurd “problematic X” from the ontological equation for the sake of conceptual parsimony of ontological idealism.

Second, “[P]henomenology … excludes every naïve metaphysics that operates with absurd things-in-themselves, but does not exclude metaphysics as such. It does no violence to the problem-motives that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of inquiry and the wrong method; and it by no means professes to stop short of the “supreme and ultimate” questions.” — Husserl

Third, “The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity.” — Husserl

Fourth, “The intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity: the universe of monads, which effects its communion in various forms.” — Husserl

As such, there are no absurd noumena, there is universal transcendental intersubjectivity — the universe of transcendental subjects (monads) harmoniously constituting intersubjective phenomenal worlds — rooted in transcendent consciousness-in-itself (Transcendence).