“Despite its many significant accomplishments, a century of mainstream scientific psychology has not provided a satisfactory theory of mind, or solved the mind-body problem. Physicalist accounts of the mind appear to be approaching their limits without fully accounting for its properties. The computational theory of the mind has been overthrown, forcing physicalism to retreat into what necessarily constitutes its final frontier, the unique biology of the brain. But this biological naturalism appears destined to fare little better. Some critical properties of mental life can already be recognized as irreconcilable in principle with physical operations of the brain, and others seem likely to prove so as well.” — Edward F. Kelly
“Oddly enough I have encountered more passion from adherents of the computational theory of the mind than from adherents of traditional religious doctrines of the soul. Some computationalists invest an almost religious intensity into their faith that our deepest problems about the mind will have a computational solution. Many people apparently believe that somehow or other, unless we are proven to be computers, something terribly important will be lost.” — John Searle
Computations, whatever sophisticated they might be, are not intelligence. The idea that we can create conscious and intelligent machines is an absurd product of failing thinking in those who are blinded by the pseudoscientific metaphysical mythology of materialism (physicalism) with its absurd reductionist neuromythology.
The problem is that the only empirical reality, including the empirical brain, that is ever given to us directly is phenomenal consciousness; hence, the empirical brain is nothing but an intersubjective phenomenon; hence, to reduce subjective phenomena to an intersubjective phenomenon is to reduce phenomena to phenomena, it is an absurd recursion, whereas to reduce phenomena to the imaginary (for it is never given empirically) “physical brain” is to reduce phenomena to a metaphysical myth of the pseudoscientific metaphysical mythology of materialism (physicalism). Therefore, when a neuroscientist reduces phenomenal consciousness to the imaginary “physical brain,” he is doing metaphysical mythology, not science. Neuroscience nowadays is so radically poisoned by the reductionist metaphysical mythology of materialism (physicalism) that it should be considered pseudoscience.
In reality, all phenomena are constituted by transcendental (inter)subjectivity from the transcendent “superposition” of consciousness-in-itself, whereas neuroscience is a branch of transcendental phenomenology which is ultimately ontological idealism.
